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denied recovery, and, as indicated, they have denied recovery in
cases where the defendant's conduct could be characterized only
as negligence. This suggests that while the interference may be
as serious in one case as in the other, the moral character of
the defendant's conduct varies the result.
In the instant case the court apparently felt that in view of
the modern attitude toward the value of the wife's interest in
the sentimental elements of consortium, even conduct which is
only negligent is sufficiently legally blameworthy, so that the
balance of interests is in favor of recovery. This means, of
course, that the court thinks it not unfair to hold the defendant
liable for these consequences, simply because the wife's interest
which was interfered with is sufficiently important to justify
such an extension of liability. In reaching its conclusion the
court took into consideration the inherent unfairness of treating
a husband's interest in the sentimental elements of consortium
differently from that of a wife, certainly a valid factor. It is not
necessary to agree with the ultimate conclusion reached by the
court in order to recognize the inherent value of the opinion.
The court has gone far toward cutting down the forest of
verbiage surrounding the earlier decisions, and toward recog-
nizing clearly the real nature of the problem presented to it.
WARREN MAICHEL
JURY TRIAL - NECESSITY OF JUDGE RECEIVING THE VERDICT.
In a recent Tennessee case,1 condemnation proceedings were
begun by the plaintiff. The trial court judge was unavoidably
detained, so he called a member of the local bar and asked him to
receive the verdict of the jury. Plaintiff objected to this pro-
cedure and immediately made a motion for a mistrial. The
motion was overruled and the verdict received. In sustaining
plaintiff's contention upon appeal, the court said that receipt of
the jury's verdict under these circumstances was a nullity and
void; that no consideration of public policy would justify the
conclusion that a member of the bar, by merely assuming the
judge's position, could clothe himself with the powers of a judge.
Whether a trial court judge can delegate his duty of receiv-
1. Tennessee Gas Transmission Co. v. Vineyard et ux., 232 S.W.2d 403(Tenn. 1950).
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ing the jury's verdict is a problem that has caused considerable
difficulty. Occasionally there will arise circumstances which
unavoidably detain a judge so that he cannot be in the court-
room when the jury is ready to return with their verdict. When
he is so absent then the question arises whether either of the
litigants has sufficient grounds on which to base a motion for a
new trial. The decided cases show that there is a split of
authority in the civil case,2 while in the criminal field there
appears to be a trend to follow the decision of the principal
case ;3 especially is this true when felonies are involved. If the
defendant is charged only with a misdemeanor then greater
liberality is allowed.4
Burden v. People5 involved a felony case in which one judge
was substituted for another while argument was going on. The
court said that, in prosecutions involving felonies, the presence
of the same judge during the entire course of the trial is essen-
tial and a judge cannot delegate his judicial authority to an-
other. This rule was followed in McClure v. State6 even though
the defendant consented to the judge's being absent. However,
in State v. Keehon7 a substitute judge received the verdict in
a murder case with the consent of the defendant; this procedure
was sustained on appeal because the court felt that receiving
the verdict was merely a ministerial act and that the parties
could agree to have another judge receive such. A North Caro-
lina case, 8 decided in 1891, goes farther that most cases in hold-
2. Granting a new trial are: Baltimore R. Co. v. Polly, 14 Gratt. 447
(Va. 1858); Allen v. Yarbrough, 201 N.C. 568, 160 S.E. 833 (1931); Brown
v. Service Coach Lines Inc., 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E.2d 436 (1944);
Shurlman v. Stock, 89 Conn. 237, 93 Atl. 531 (1915) ; Ralston v. Stump, 75
Ohio App. 375, 62 N.E. 2d.293 (1942). Denying a new trial are: Dubuc v.
Lazell, Dalley & Co., 182 N.Y. 482, 75 N.E. 401 (1905); Durkee v. Murphy,
181 Md. 259, 29 A.2d 253 (1942). Compare Nelson v. Wood, 210 F. 18
(3rd. Cir. 1916); Barger Bros. v. Alley, 167 N.C. 362, 83 S.E. 612 (1914).
In Koon v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 106 (1881) a sealed verdict
was returned and judge later opened and received the verdict; the court
refused to grant the defendant a new trial
3. Walters v. State, 6 Ga. App. 565, 65 S.E. 357 (1909); State v. Keehn,
85 Kan. 765, 118 Pac. 851 (1911) ; Burden v. People, 192 Ill. 493, 61 N.E.
317 (1901) ; Jones v. State, 97 Ala. 77, 12 So. 274 (1893); Quinn v. State,
130 Ind. 340, 30 N.E. 300 (1892) ; State v. Austin, 108 N.C. 780, 13 S.E. 219(1891).
4. Brown v. State, 63 Ala. 97 (1879).
5. 192 II. 493, 61 N.E. 317 (1901).
6. 77 Ind. 287 (1880).
7. 85 Kan. 765, 118 Pac. 851 (1911).
8. State v. Austin, 108 N.C. 780, 13 S.E. 219 (1891).
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ing that the clerk of the court can receive the verdict, except
in capital cases, so long as the defendant has opportunity to
voice his objections.
When the action is civil, there is a split of authority as to
whether the judge's presence is necessary when the verdict is
rendered. In Dubuc v. Lazell, Dalley & Co.0 the parties con-
sented to the judge's absence and the court held that the parties
were bound by such agreement. The decision points out that
parties can waive constitutional, statutory or any other right
so long as it isn't against good morals or sound public policy,
and that such stipulations will generally be enforced by the
court. Actually such procedure is an irregularity because the
court isn't organized when the judge is absent, but the consent
of the parties cover this irregularity.Y' Various reasons for
these decisions are expressed by the courts: that before a verdict
becomes final it should receive the approval of the mind and
conscience of the trial judge ;" or that until the judge's approval
is given to the verdict, it doesn't become binding if there is a
motion for a new trial based on general grounds. 2 Several
decisions hold that only the trial judge can receive the verdict
even though the parties agree to his absence.
1 3
At least one of the states, New Jersey, has dealt with the
problem by statute. 4 The statute provides for the taking of
the verdict by the clerk of the court when the trial judge is
absent. But the cases decided under this statute have held that
he can exercise no discretion in receiving the verdict ;1
25 if it
isn't responsive to the issues, the clerk can't make the jury
return for further deliberation.
It seems that the practice of giving consent to the judge's
being absent could lead to many difficulties even though such
agreements are not so contrary to public policy as to warrant
their being declared void. It is well known that in many in-
9. 182 N.Y. 482, 75 N.E. 401 (1905).
10. Durkee v. Murphy, 181 Md. 259 29 A.2d 253 (1942).
11. Brown v. Service Coach Lines Inc., 71 Ga. App. 437, 31 S.E. 2d 436
(1944).
12. Walters v. State, 6 Ga. App. 565, 65 S.E. 357 (1909).
13. Baltimore R. Co. v. Polly, 14 Gratt. 447 (Va. 1858); Britton v. Fox,
39 Ind. 369 (1872).
14. District Court Act, 2 Comp. St., 27 (1910).
15. Sockolowski v. Olkowsld et aL., 102 N.J.L. 50, 130 Atl. 514 (Sup. Ct.
1925) ; Folkner v. Hopkins, 100 N.J.L. 189, 126 Atl. 633 (Sup. Ct. 1924).
Washington University Open Scholarship
COMMENTS 273
stances the verdicts of juries are not responsive to the issues
submitted to them; especially is this true when special inter-
rogatories are left to their decision. If the verdict is not re-
sponsive and the jury disperses then additional costs arise be-
cause a new trial will have to be held. Also the crowded court
dockets and the additional delay involved, if the verdict is not
responsive, seem to present other compelling reasons for avoid-
ing such a practice, and an attorney should avoid any agreement
whereby his client may suffer extra costs and delay in the long
run.
MERLE C. BASSETT
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